In the first blog from our 2026 Atomic Anxiety Fellows cohort, Janani Mohan argues that we need a new approach to reinvigorate nuclear disarmament in the new era of great power politics …
The year is 2026 and the nuclear news cycle is abuzz: Russia has indicated a willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend its territory. The United States has threatened to wipe out Iran’s “whole civilization”.
At the same time, Iran is posturing its interest in proliferating nuclear weapons, an Israeli politician has alluded to deploying its nuclear arsenal, and an escalation between India and Pakistan has placed nuclear assets at risk.
All of these recent developments underscore our increased need for de-escalation and disarmament, but also highlight the pragmatic difficulties we will face in achieving them.
The issue is simple: the Cold War era of statesmanship, bilateral treaties, and confidence-building measures is dead.
Efforts to pursue disarmament today are often viewed as too idealistic and strategically unfavorable, while ignoring the substantial benefit that a disarmament agenda provides for maintaining a normative nuclear taboo against nuclear weapons use.
The past few years shows us how much nuclear norms can weaken over a short period of time. Increased nuclear weapons rhetoric coupled with decreased accountability has been unhelpful.
Meanwhile, memories of World War II, the Cold War, and notions of never again are fading from living memory. Yet, there is still hope for nuclear de-escalation and norms reinforcement, via disarmament.
A disarmament agenda could provide an important counter to prevent the slow degradation of the nuclear taboo.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is one of the most landmark pushes towards disarmament in recent years. The TPNW, which prohibits member states from developing nuclear weapons, has been lauded for bolstering disarmament by reproaching its slow progress, recognizing its “ethical imperative”, and reaffirming state support for a nuclear weapon free world.
Yet, with all nuclear weapons states criticizing the treaty and refusing to participate, the TPNW’s direct impact on disarmament is marginal. However, its secondary impact via nuclear stigmatization and norms reinforcement is vital.
Non-nuclear weapons states keeping alive conversations on disarmament is requisite in an increasingly multipolar world. As great powers contend for primacy, their willingness to reduce their own strength via disarmament shrinks. Yet, criticism from small and middle states, especially allied states, helps maintain the line between great powers having a nuclear arsenal and being willing to use it.
Current approaches to disarmament therefore arguably play a more practically important role in preventing nuclear use than in reducing nuclear arsenals.
Disarmament efforts today illustrate the reasons why nuclear weapons are harmful and provide activists with a clear objective to center communications and strategies. This activism then strengthens fundamental ethical frameworks that reflect beyond nuclear nonproliferation to traditions of nuclear non-use.
Disarmament is not the objective itself—it’s a strategic tool to reinforce nuclear norms.
Disarmament as an objective in and of itself only makes sense in an outdated world of statesmanship, where liberal countries sought policies that were better for a common good.
In the modern, escalated environment, realist notions of survival and supremacy have killed off the statesman, so to speak, leaving behind strongman tactics that rely on military strength and credible threats.
Understanding disarmament as a strategic tool could therefore enable greater support from pragmatists who view disarmament as unrealistic because “short of universal brain surgery, nothing can erase the memory of weapons and how to build them”.
Indeed, conceptualizing disarmament as benefitting the nuclear taboo overall may also convince great powers to commit to nuclear restraint.
When considering recent global crises and escalation, a new pathway for disarmament is therefore illuminated, wherein nuclear norms advocates, including those within great powers, realize that respect for disarmament is critical to their work.
Will disarmament happen in the next few decades? Probably not. But a disarmament agenda can prevent nuclear use while leaving a door open for future arms control and reductions.
Disarmament requires a new logic, not new pushback.
Shifting our understanding of disarmament can thus lead to a better metric to measure its effectiveness, especially in states reluctant to adopt associated measures. This new logic for disarmament can perhaps be adopted in a few ways:
First, states that are against disarmament for themselves should support the disarmament efforts of non-nuclear weapons states instead of attempting to constrain them, from the understanding that this builds a culture of nuclear restraint.
Second, states that are for disarmament should be realistic in their expectations and build strategies for disarmament that place it within broader normative conversations and taboo reinforcement.
Third, all states should commit to disarmament as the ideal global objective while acknowledging that a gap exists between this ideal and the realities of nuclear deterrence today.
These methods offer a starting point for moving disarmament into a space where it can make a meaningful difference.
New conversations on disarmament, particularly those engaging actors that have escalated over the past few years, could help reset nuclear tensions. Meanwhile, new actions on disarmament, even if limited in scope, could help reinvigorate nuclear norms.
And who knows: perhaps, one day soon we will be able to once again return to a period of nuclear peace – and a quieter nuclear news cycle.
Janani Mohan is researching on nuclear energy and deterrence policy as part of her PhD at the University of Cambridge, where she is a recipient of the Gates Cambridge award. She holds her Master in International Policy from Stanford University, where she was a Ford Dorsey and McCaw Fellow, and her Bachelor in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. Janani has extensive experience as a policy analyst including collaborating with the United Nations Innovation Cell to monitor open-source intelligence from the War in Ukraine, consulting with the United Nations Development Programme in South Africa to increase technology access for marginalized youth, and supporting the U.S. Department of State on nuclear nonproliferation initiatives.
This blog is part of a series of articles by the Atomic Anxiety in the New Nuclear Age Fellows Cohort. These articles represent the view of the author and not necessarily those of the project as a whole or other individuals associated with the project.
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