Atomic Anxiety in the New Nuclear Age

A new trend is emerging in nuclear politics, writes Atomic Anxiety Fellow Thomas J. Shattuck, one where foreign investment in the US leads to nuclear cooperation. In our latest Fellows blog post, we dive into the art of the atomic deal…

Since his first term in office, President Donald J Trump has expressed deep skepticism about the US alliance system, particularly regarding the amount of money a country is “contributing” to the United States. This is now a source of what we might call atomic anxiety in global politics, from East Asia, to the Europe, the Middle East, and beyond.

South Korea was a prime target for these complaints during the first Trump administration. Conversations about East Asian allies, namely South Korea and Japan, developing their own nuclear weapons to bolster their own deterrent capabilities increased.

After coming into office, the Biden administration worked to squash those desires by reaffirming the US nuclear umbrella in the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, it also finalized the AUKUS nuclear pact with Australia and the United Kingdom to help Canberra develop nuclear-powered submarines. The nuclear policy space appeared to have stabilized, and the risk of a country breaking a long-held international norm and going nuclear was averted.

Then, Donald Trump was re-elected. Fears surrounding alliance credibility and stability returned – on hyperdrive.

The second Trump administration initiated a formal review of the AUKUS Pact in June 2025. South Korean concerns about Trump’s de-prioritization of the alliance also resurfaced in the aftermath of the political instability from the December 2024 martial law crisis. The global tariff implementation, including those imposed on allies, further upended views on US reliability.

President Trump has been clear that the road to better bilateral relations under his second term will involve increased foreign investment into the US homeland to achieve his goal of revitalizing the US manufacturing base.

This foreign policy priority may help to explain why Australia and South Korea have not been the subject of negative attention from the Trump White House. During Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Washington in October 2025, he secured Trump’s commitment to AUKUS, which represents an Australian investment in the US defense manufacturing base. The summit also concluded various deals and investments related to critical minerals and Australian investments in the United States.

Similarly, during Trump’s visit to South Korea for the APEC summit in November 2025, President Lee Jae Myung received US approval to build nuclear-powered attack submarines. Part of the price, included in the US-ROK trade deal: A South Korean commitment to invest $150 billion in US shipbuilding. It may appear that alliance commitments, and even nuclear capabilities, will strengthen through the power of the foreign purse.

Another example demonstrating the connection between nuclear commitments and economic investment occurred during the November 2025 US-Saudi Arabia summit, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman secured the signing of the “Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation, which builds the legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership” between the countries.

The summit statement also includes $1 trillion of Saudi investment in the United States. Despite the success of the civil nuclear cooperation, Saudi Arabia did not secure a formal defense treaty with the United States, nor did it secure permission for domestic uranium enrichment.

However, the summit demonstrates another example of a US ally or partner securing some sort of nuclear agreement, reassurance, or capability from the Trump administration in light of significant investments in the US homeland.

Less than one year into Trump’s second term, a trend is emerging: if a country announces the intention to invest billions, or even trillions, into the United States, then it will likely leave a meeting with President Trump with a nuclear cooperation agreement.

Countries are not getting everything that they want from Trump, but this trend represents a troubling development: American economic security in exchange for nuclear cooperation.

As the atomic anxiety of one country is soothed, those of others may be exacerbated, and as the second Trump administration continues, countries may begin to ask for more nuclear security.

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Thomas J. Shattuck is a Senior Program Manager at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. His research focuses on cross-Strait relations, Taiwanese and Chinese domestic and foreign affairs, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, and the US role in the Indo-Pacific. Shattuck is a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute, Non-Resident Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, member of Foreign Policy for America’s NextGen Foreign Policy Initiative, and the Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program.

This blog is part of a series of articles by the Atomic Anxiety in the New Nuclear Age Fellows Cohort. These articles represent the view of the author and not necessarily those of the project as a whole or other individuals associated with the project.